

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 148092
ORIGIN INR-07

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DRAFTED BY INR/RSE/SOV:JCOLLINS
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INR/ODR:MPACKMAN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY SANA
AMEMBASSY VICTORIA
AMCONSUL DJIBOUTI
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T STATE 148092

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, PINS, SU, US

SUBJECT:

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1891, B. STATE 8923

1. INR HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF SOVIET
INTENTIONS REGARDING SUDAN, ETHIOPIA, AND LIBYA FOR YOUR
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USE IN BRIEFING DENG. THE ANALYSIS UPDATES THAT PROVIDED
IN JANUARY (REF B) FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S BRIEFING OF
NIMEIRI. IN BRIEFING DENG YOU MAY DRAW ON BOTH THE UPDATED
ANALYSIS AND THAT FROM JANUARY, BUT YOU SHOULD NOT PROVIDE
ANY OF THIS INFORMATION IN WRITING OR MAKE ANY ATTRIBUTION
TO INR.

2. MOSCOW IS CLEARLY ANGERED AT PRESIDENT NIMEIRI'S RECENT MOVES TO REDUCE THE SOVIET ROLE IN SUDAN, AND HAS REACTED SHARPLY TO HIS OUSTER OF SOVIET MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, HIS FLIRTATION WITH THE CHINESE AND HIS MORE STRIDENT CRITICISM OF THE USSR. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO REAL EVIDENCE THAT THE KREMLIN IS ACTIVELY STIRRING UP TROUBLE FOR NIMEIRI AT HOME (THROUGH THE SUDANESE COMMUNISTS) OR ENCOURAGING OTHERS (MENGISTU OR QUADHAFI) TO DO SO THROUGH ANTI-NIMEIRI FORCES UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE.

ETHIOPIA

3. RECENT SOVIET MOVES IN ETHIOPIA IN THE CONTEXT OF MENGISTU'S CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL OVER THE ADDIS ABABA REGIME ARE PROBABLY CALCULATED TO:

-- MAKE THE USSR THE DOMINANT OUTSIDE INFLUENCE IN THAT COUNTRY, AND IN THE HORN;

-- WRITE FINIS TO US PREEMINENCE IN ETHIOPIA AND FORESTALL ANY MOVE BY MENGISTU TOWARD CLOSER TIES WITH CHINA; AND

-- OFFSET SETBACKS IN SUDAN AND STRENGTHEN THE KREMLIN'S HAND IN COUNTERING CONSERVATIVE ARAB-BACKED ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE RED SEA AREA.

IN ADDITION, IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARGUED STRONGLY
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FOR SOME POSITIVE RESPONSE TO MENGISTU'S OVERTURES. THE ADDIS ABABA REVOLUTIONARY REGIME'S PROCLAMATION OF A MARXIST COURSE, ITS INCREASINGLY RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM, AND OPEN COURTSHIP OF THE USSR, MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO IGNORE ADDIS ABABA'S REQUESTS WITHOUT TARNISHING THE USSR'S IMAGE AS THE LEADER AND PATRON OF AFRICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION.

4. SINCE LAST WINTER, THE SOVIETS HAVE INCREASED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ADDIS REGIME SIGNIFICANTLY, AND THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE EFFORTS WILL CONTINUE. SO FAR, THE KREMLIN HAS PROVIDED BOTH MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE ADDIS ABABA GOVERNMENT.

THE USSR HAS REPLACED THE US AS ETHIOPIA'S PRINCIPAL MILITARY SUPPLIER, AND DELIVERIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING TANKS) HAVE BEGUN. EAST EUROPEAN STATES ARE PROVIDING ARMS AND OTHER AID, AND CUBANS ARE TRAINING THE EMERGING "POPULAR MILITIA."

5. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THE SOVIETS ARE EVIDENTLY ATTEMPTING TO EASE PRESSURES ON THE MENGISTU REGIME BY

TRYING TO DISSUADE SOMALIA FROM OPEN MOVES TO REGAIN SOMALI-INHABITED ETHIOPIAN TERRITORIES AND BY TRYING TO MEDiate THE ERITREAN CRISIS. NEITHER EFFORT APPEARS TO HAVE MADE ANY PROGRESS. IN A SIMILAR FASHION, THE TASS STATEMENT EARLIER THIS MONTH WARNING SUDAN NOT TO USE FORCE AGAINST ETHIOPIA WAS PROBABLY DESIGNED TO FORESTALL ANY SUDANESE ACTION THAT MIGHT HAVE HINDERED THE RECENT ETHIOPIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE EDU.

LIBYA

6. ALTHOUGH SOVIET BACKING FOR QADHAFI DURING THE RECENT EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN TENSIONS AND CONTINUING DELIVERY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO LIBYA SUGGEST A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP
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BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, NEITHER SIDE YET TRUSTS THE OTHER'S MOTIVES. BASIC IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS REMAIN, AND THE USSR CONTINUES TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT QADHAFI'S FANATICISM AND HIS SEEMINGLY ERRATIC ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD. THERE IS STILL NO SOLID EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ENCOURAGED QADHAFI TO CREATE TROUBLE FOR NIMEIRI, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY INDEED SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN FUELING THAT ENDEMIC FEUD. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT QADHAFI HAS ACTED AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY, PURSUING HIS OWN FOREIGN POLICY GOALS, WHILE THE SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, PROBABLY ACCEPT THE FACT THEY CAN EXERCISE LITTLE REAL INFLUENCE OVER QADHAFI IN SUCH MATTERS.

SOVIET INTENTIONS

7. SOVIET INTENTIONS IN BOTH ETHIOPIA AND LIBYA SEEM CLEAR. THE USSR ALMOST CERTAINLY HOPES TO EXPLOIT THE NEEDS OF TWO INTERNATIONALLY ISOLATED REGIMES IN ORDER TO BUILD AN INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURING THE KREMLIN OF PREEMINENT INFLUENCE IN BOTH COUNTRIES. WHETHER THE SOVIETS CAN SUCCEED IN THIS EFFORT OVER THE LONG RUN IS ESSENTIALLY UNPREDICTABLE. FOR THE NEAR TERM, HOWEVER, THE USSR'S LONG-TERM AMBITIONS IN ETHIOPIA AND LIBYA AND OTHER SOVIET POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE AREA ARGUE FOR IT TO DISCOURAGE MENGISTU AND QADHAFI FROM ADVENTURIST POLICIES.

8. ON THE ETHIOPIAN FRONT, MOSCOW PROBABLY REGARDS ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVE AT THIS STAGE AS ENSURING MENGISTU'S SURVIVAL. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE KREMLIN WOULD VIEW THIS END AS BEING WELL SERVED BY MOVES AGAINST SUDAN WHICH RISKED ADDING THE SUDANESE TO THE ALREADY IMPRESSIVE LIST
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OF ACTIVE MILITARY OPPONENTS RANGED AGAINST MENGISTU.

9. SIMILARLY, ON THE LIBYAN SIDE, THE SOVIETS AT THIS
STAGE ALMOST CERTAINLY FEAR THAT OVERT ACTION BY QADHAFI
AGAINST SUDAN COULD EMBROIL HIS REGIME IN AN ACTIVE
CONFLICT WITH SUDAN AND EGYPT AND WOULD JEOPARDIZE SOVIET
HOPE OF IMPROVING TIES WITH EGYPT.
VANCE

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ORIGIN AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /011 R

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DRAFTED BY:AF/E:KLWAUCHOPE

APPROVED BY:AF/E:RSPOST

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R 020530Z JUL 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T STATE 148092

FOLLOWING SECSTATE 148092 SENT ACTION KHARTOUM INFO NAIROBI
SANA VICTORIA DJIBOUTI ADDIS ABABA JIDDA CAIRO JUNE 24, 1977
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 148092

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, PINS, SU, US

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TO INR.

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CONFLICT WITH SUDAN AND EGYPT AND WOULD JEOPARDIZE SOVIET HOPE OF IMPROVING TIES WITH EGYPT. VANCE UNQUOTE
CHRISTOPHER

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NNN

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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
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Drafter: JCOLLINS
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Reference: 77 KHARTOUM 1891, 77 STATE 8923
Retention: 0
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TAGS: PFOR, PINS, PINR, SU, US, UR, ET, LY
To: KHARTOUM
Type: TE
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